La Parisienne

One hundred and thirty-two years ago, a reviewer visiting the first impressionist exhibition of 1874 saw Renoir's painting 'La Parisienne' and wrote:

'The toe of her ankle boot is almost invisible, and peeps out like a mouse. Her hat is tilted over one ear and is daringly coquettish... The smile is false and the face is a strange mixture of the old and the childish. One gets the impression that this litle lady is trying hard to look chaste.'

'La Parisienne' by Auguste Renoir

It is interesting that more than 100 years after these words were written, I recognise my own impression of the present day 'Parisiennes'. And not just in these words, in the painting itself as well. Her clothes might be completely different, but that doesn't matter. Last year I spent three months in Paris, and there is something about the girls I saw and met there that seperates them from every other girl. Not just from foreign girls like me, but also from the French girls that were not born and raised in Paris. That something I saw back in this painting. Its their attitude. There is no way to describe this attitude, but Renoir managed to do it with oil on canvas. Its timeless, and from all the paintings in the National Museum of Wales it left the biggest impression with me.

The limits of Moore’s Law

Challenged by increasing competition and changing consumer demands, Intel’s CEO Paul Otellini led a major reorganisation of the world’s largest chipmaker. Will his effort bear fruit?



When Gordon Moore, one of the co-founders of Intel, predicted in 1965 that the number of transistors on a microprocessor would double every 18 months, he could not know that speed would seize to be the most important feature of a chip.
Moore’s Law, as his prediction became known, ruled the industry for years. Although technically it did not reach its limits yet, the accompanying marketing message that more megahertz, and later gigahertz, is better did. In 2004 consumer purchases of computers exceeded those by business, and consumers care more about features such as design, reliability, communication functions, and price, than how computers work inside.[1]
However, Intel’s long-time ensured place as market leader might have caused the company to loose sight of customer demands. Intel’s chips are still inside 80 percent of every computer sold, but disappointing results and the rise of its smaller rival Advanced Micro Devices shocked its confidence.


This insecurity is reflected in Intel’s share price, which has moved in extremes since 2001 (see chart 1). After a quick rise to $36 in the last two months of 2001, the share price suffered a decline of 50 percent during 2002. Intel managed to recover from this loss in the following year, ending 2003 with a doubled share price of $32.
However, from 2004 the number one chipmaker started to experience serious competition from AMD. While AMD’s share price made a spectacular jump throughout 2004 and 2005, Intel’s share price fell more than 25 percent.
In May 2005 Paul Otellini was appointed to succeed Craig Barrett as the new chief executive officer. Otellini, the first CEO with a background in marketing rather than engineering, recognised the need for change as early as 2001. In 2005 Otellini reorganised Intel according to ‘Platformisation’, which means the bundling of groups of chips on different branded platforms.[2]
So far, this new focus on marketing has not paid off. Intel’s share price saw a small increase during 2005, but fell back by one third in the first half of 2006. The share price recently started a cautious rise, but it is still around $21. While the average of technology stocks is back on 2002’s level, Intel’s share price decreased almost 40 percent in five years. The coming period will determine whether Intel’s shareholders can be convinced that Otellini’s strategy is a plausible replacement of Moore’s Law.

Intel’s latest earnings release show that the chip maker is not by far back on its old level. Intel’s revenue increased between 2002 and 2005. However, the growth rates slowed down and in 2006, at the end of all three quarters revenue was lower than in the previous year (see chart 2).
A possible reason is Intel’s high dependence on the sales of computers, while the growth of this market has stagnated.[3] Intel’s revenue comes for 65 percent from the Digital Enterprise Group, which produces PCs and servers for businesses, and 29 percent from the Mobility Group, which largely produces for laptops. In the overall semiconductor industry, on the other hand, just 45 percent of the revenue comes from computers (see chart 3). So far, Intel has failed to infiltrate rapid growing markets such as home entertainment and mobile phones, which is now the second largest user of semiconductors.[4]

Remarkable is that the growth rates were much higher for Intel’s income and earnings per share than for revenue. This suggests that changes in income were largely due to a reduction or increase in costs rather than to rising or falling sales. The difference was most extreme in 2002, when revenue increased with just 1 percent, while net income and EPS both went up by 140 percent, respectively from $1.3m to $3.1m and from $0,19 to $0,47. Such reduction of costs while revenue stagnates indicates that Intel was investing in short rather than long term results. This might partly explain why its spectacular growth did not continue and reversed in 2006.
However less spectacular, Intel’s gross income changed faster than its revenue as well. Between 2002 and 2005, its gross margin went up from 50 to 59 percent and fell back to 49 percent in the third quarter of 2006.

While Intel presented continuous growth rates between 2002 and 2005, its share price fell. This suggests that other negative factors had a dominant influence on Intel’s image and shareholders’ expectations.
Indeed, Intel made several internal missteps in recent years. Design problems, cancellation or delay of new products, and aborted strategies have cost sales and caused an inventory build-up.[5] As a result, Intel had to announce a 10 percent cut of its global workforce, from 102,500 to 92,000 by the middle of 2007.[6]
Furthermore, a major challenge to Intel’s market leadership has been AMD. In the last few years, AMD was ahead of Intel in launching innovations. AMD’s chips have been faster while using less power, and above these benefits they cost less than Intel’s.[7]
A further blow to Intel’s image has been caused by several investigations following antitrust complaints by AMD. In 2005, the Japan Fair Trade Commission concluded that Intel had violated antitrust laws in Japan since 2002. The JFTC said Intel offered rebates to PC makers if they would limit their purchases from AMD.[8] An investigation into similar practices by the European Commission continues, as investigations in South Korea and a lawsuit launched by AMD in the United States. However, in September of this year the judge dismissed major parts of the lawsuit in favour of Intel and postponed the trial date till 2009.[9]
Following these problems, as well as competition in the PC industry, both Microsoft and Dell decided to stop there exclusive deals with Intel. Microsoft is using IBM chips in its Xbox since 2004 and this year, Dell agreed to use AMD chips in a server product.[10]

Despite of the many difficulties, there are several indications that not all is lost for Intel.
In its latest forecast, the Semiconductor Industry Association predicted a further rise in global sales of semiconductors. The SIA said that the Asia-Pacific is the fastest-growing region and is expected to be 48.2% of the worldwide chip market in 2009.[11] In this respect, Intel is ahead of the market with 50% of its revenue coming from the Asia-Pacific area.[12]
However, according to the SIA the sales increase is mainly driven by consumer purchases, while Intel just recently recognised the specific demands of this group. The newest PCs are designed for high quality multimedia rather than for corporate use and the technical possibilities of Moore’s Law are irrelevant for these needs. Moreover, the sales growth of PCs, Intel’s core market, is small compared to the rapid rise of mobile phones and home entertainment products.
Intel is behind other chipmakers in producing for these growing markets, but Paul Otellini has created new possibilities for the company. Under his platform strategy Intel has been divided in five platforms in January 2005. The two divisions with Intel’s largest market share are Digital Enterprise for business computers and Mobility for laptops and wireless communication. With this last division Intel also seeks to gain share in the mobile phone sector, which is now dominated by its rival Texas Instruments.[13] To infiltrate the home entertainment market, by contributing to the ongoing convergence of consumer computers and electronics, Intel created the Digital Home platform.[14] Furthermore, the platforms Digital Health and Channel Products were created for emerging markets. In November 2005 the Flash Memory division was added. About the potential of ‘platformism’ Otellini said: “The new organisation will help address growth and opportunities by better anticipating and addressing market needs.”[15]
Another advantage of the strategy is that AMD cannot do it. Intel’s rival is too small for such an organisation and they would need third parties to make platforms.[16]
A further opportunity for Intel came last year, when the chipmaker established a partnership with Apple. The importance of this deal lies in Apple’s innovative place in the PC industry, especially in mobility and home entertainment, exactly those two markets Intel is planning to conquer.[17] For example, Intel is investing in the production of the Nand flash memory, which can be used in Apple’s iPod.[18]

Recent results suggest a comeback for Intel. In September of this year, Intel announced a new product, a quad-core chip, ahead of AMD for the first time in two years. Paul Otellini said: “I believe very much that with this new set of dual and quad-core microprocessors we’ve now regained our leadership.”[19]
Patrick Gelsinger, head of the Digital Enterprise division, said: “We are more focused and more angry. That we can go through downturns and come out stronger is the mark of a great company.”[20] Intel has recaptured its confidence, and it seems the market has renewed its trust in the chipmaker too. Although Intel’s latest quarter report presented declined revenue and income compared to last year, the results were higher than Wall Street expected, and Intel’s share price started a cautious rise.[21]


Intel’s future success depends on whether the chipmaker will gain share in growing markets. Paul Otellini seems to be the right man for this job. He realised early that it is time for Intel to look further than the traditional PC market. Moore’s Law might have reached its limits, but Intel has not. New inspiration comes from Robert Noyce, another co-founder of Intel, who said: “Do not be encumbered by history. Go off and do something wonderful.”


[1] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 9 February 2005, p.15.
[2] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 9 February 2005, p.15.
[3] ‘Intel’s right-hand turn’, The Economist, 14 May 2006.
[4] ‘Intel’s right-hand turn’, The Economist, 14 May 2006.
[5] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 9 February 2005, p.15.
[6] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 6 September 2006.
[7] ‘Not paranoid enough’, The Economist, 27 May 2006, p.74.
[8] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 2 April 2005, p.8.
[9] Tobias Buck, Financial Times, 4 October 2006, p.26; Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 28 September 2006, p.29; Roger Parloff, Fortune, 9 April 2006.
[10] Kevin Allison and Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 19 May 2006, pp. 1, 16.
[11] Semiconductor Industry Association’s annual forecast, 16 November 2006, www.sia-online.org [11 December 2006].
[12] Intel’s annual report 2005, www.intel.com [12 December 2006].
[13] Gene G. Marcial, Business Week, 14 February 2005, p.98.
[14] Cliff Edwards, Business Week, 9 January 2006, p.46.
[15] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 18 January 2005, p.29.
[16] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 9 February 2005, p.15.
[17] ‘New best friends’, The Economist, 6 November 2005; Cliff Edwards, Business Week, 9 January 2006, p.46.
[18] David Whelan, Forbes, 4 October 2006.
[19] Chris Nuttall, Financial Times, 27 September 2006, p.22.
[20] David Whelan, Forbes, 4 October 2006.
[21] Don Clark, Wall Street Journal, 18 October 2006, p.2.

China’s rise, America’s fall, global consequences?

Everyone who has been shopping for clothes or electronics during the past years cannot have missed the words ‘Made in China’. In the same period, the words ‘Fall of Dollar’ must have been noticed by every reader of newspapers worldwide.
These two simple sentences indicate a worldwide influence of two major economic powers, an influence that reaches much further than cheap products and exchange rates. In this context, the dialogue the United States and China agreed on last Wednesday is of global importance. Will the two super powers act as such, or are they more concerned with their national interest? After all, their economies do not only affect the world, they have at least as much impact on each other. Indeed, when Paul Kennedy asked himself “Whose economy will decline fastest, relative to such expanding states as Japan, China, etc.?”[1] in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers of 1988, the United States already feared the answer.


In the light of China’s rise and its recent entrance to the WTO in 2001, the new agreement is a logical next step in the US-China relationship. China’s acceptance to the WTO came a long way, after years of resistance from Washington and negotiations about conditions. Today, many bilateral commitments made between the two economic powers in 2001, such as the sensitive issue of China’s intellectual property rights, have not been fulfilled yet.[2] Both powers expect that an intensive high level dialogue will deal with their agenda more effectively. However, while Washington is determined to address China’s legal liberalisation, Beijing is mostly interested in economic benefits. Can the new dialogue overcome these clashing goals, as well as resolve other issues of conflict?
Even more questionable is the “long-term strategic view to managing this relationship” aimed for by US treasury secretary Hank Paulson.[3] With the prospects of a Democrat mid-term victory and the ending of the Bush presidency in two years in mind, the Democrats’ China-policy might be at least as important for the future US-China dialogue.

What worries both Republicans and Democrats is the major US trade deficit, which is, as chart 1 suggests, largely caused by cheap Chinese export products. The solution, Washington argues, is a revaluation of the yuan. The Chinese government holds its currency artificially low, to prevent national instability in this time of spectacular economic growth.[4]
However, it is contestable whether revaluation will make much difference for the US trade deficit. As Doug Guthrie, professor at New York University, argues in his book China and Globalization: it are the Americans themselves “who drive that deficit by shopping at Wal-Mart, which is the single-largest contributor to it.”[5] In other words, rather than by unfair competition the US trade deficit is caused by America’s high consumption, and if China does not supply for it another cheap production country will.

A much more important, and less easy to change, issue in the present US-China relationship is the so-called “revived Bretton Woods system.” To keep its exchange rate pegged to the dollar, China has been buying US treasury bonds increasingly over the past years. As chart 2 shows, the PRC is now the second largest holder, only after Japan.[6] By doing so, China largely finances the trade deficit it causes. In effect, the US and China economies are deeply interdependent.

To press for rapid change to this situation is not in anyone’s interest. By dumping parts of its bond holdings, China could cause an immediate fall of the dollar and a depression in the US economy. And because the global economy is attached to the dollar, the whole world would suffer from this, including China.[7] The new US-China relationship cannot bring an end to this tension. However, an intensive senior dialogue might manage the situation, in order to let it develop gradually.
Dr David Williams, lecturer at Cardiff University, argues: “To understand where the US-China relation will go, you only have to look at the history of the US relation with Japan.” Indeed, only decades ago the US viewed Japan as a major economical threat and the cause of these fears fit the same pattern as the present US-China relation. The US relation with Japan cooled down, even though their interdependence through US treasury bonds did not change. What did change, and what will change in the case of China, is the state of the economy. According to Dr Williams, “No country can grow every year, and as China’s economy will ease, the US-China relationship will ease down as well.”[8]

What distinguishes China from Japan, however, is its significant influence on the global economy. Compared to other emerging economies, China is relatively open. The sum of China’s exports and imports is about 75 percent of its GDP, compared to about 25 percent in for example India and Japan.[9] In effect, since China entered the world markets in 2001, it has a noticeable impact on global supply and demand. In short, this means that everything China supplies to the global markets, such as labour and manufactured products, decreases in value, while the prices of the products it demands, such as capital and raw materials, rise. China is now the second-largest oil consumer, only after the US, and its increasing demand has contributed to the risen oil price. Needless to say, oil has become a major factor of competition between the US and China.[10] A more indirect result has been a global decrease in wages, but also growing profits, lower interest rates, and, because China’s export exceeds its import by far, low inflation.[11] These effects would be counteracted by a revaluation of the yuan, which is likely to happen under pressure of the new dialogue with the US. So, ironically, many Americans might be damaged by Washington’s efforts to control China’s economy. And when the US economy suffers, the rest of the world will notice.

The new dialogue focuses on economic issues, but the US government will also use it to deal with political issues, such as further liberalisation. So far, China seems not in a hurry to answer these pressures. China values its strong state sovereignty, developed following Cold War containment and the PRC’s non-recognised status by the US until its entrance to the UN in 1971. Today, this translates in China’s ideal of ‘multipolarity’, which contrasts the American ideal of spreading its own system of democracy and capitalism. In the new context, ‘multipolarity’ means to cooperate to achieve common economical interests, while respecting each other’s different political cultures.[12]

China’s entrance to the WTO indicates that it considers its state sovereignty as complementary to free trade, and the country has made considerable concessions for this. However, the US government sees this as an encouragement to press China for more reforms. As argued, this is not likely to happen soon. And in the long term, the process will possibly be disturbed by the in power gaining Democrats. The more protectionist Democrat Party considers free trade with China a major threat to American jobs. A possible Democrat congress could argue for trade restrictions on China to protect the American market, despite of WTO rules.[13] It might also draw more attention to social issues, or even restore the old link between China’s human rights record and economic relations. President Bush might have made calls for Christian rights in China,[14] the US government no longer lets these issues determine economical relations. The sanction-and-isolation policy following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre made place for the more sensible idea that social change will follow economic engagement.[15]

Another concern of both Republicans and Democrats, which lies underneath the surface of all economic policies, is China’s military power. In The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy argued not only that economic strength is relative, but also that economic growth will be followed by military rise. Indeed, the idea of China as a ‘candidate Great Power’ has frightened Washington ever since the PRC’s establishment in 1949. The initial shock faded through the 1960s and 1970s when appeared that China had weakened rather than developed, but arouse again by China’s nuclear activities.[16]
The latest annual report by the Pentagon suggests that the US government views Beijing as a serious military threat.[17] However, statistics show that these worries are unreasonable. China’s defence spending has risen in line with its economy and stayed around 8 percent of the national budget, against more than 16 percent in the US. Moreover, in 2001 America’s military spending was 17 times higher than China’s, and larger than that of all other countries in the world.[18]
Besides, rather than placing military bases abroad like the US, China uses ‘soft power’ to expand its authority in South East Asia and, since recently, Africa. Washington views this expansion as a threat to its own hegemony. However, in the light of their recent agreement, China’s diplomatic relations might prove useful to the US, that could use its stronger ties with Beijing as a foot in the door in South East Asia.[19]


Two things restrict a significant impact of the new US-China relationship on the global economy: the rising Democrats and the conflicting goals of the two super powers. The best potential the senior dialogue has is to manage the tensions between Washington and Beijing by taking up ruling misunderstandings on political, military and social issues. The more stable basis of their relationship this might create is of global interest. However, who expects directly visible and principle changes will be disappointed. The US-China economical interdependence will remain in place, Washington will stay suspicious towards its colleagues in Beijing, China will keep rising, and the rest of the world will feel the effects.

[1] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (London 1988), p.532.
[2] ‘U.S. Is Urged to Press China on WTO Obligations’, in: Wall Street Journal, 17 November 2006, p.8.
[3] ‘Dialogue with Beijing will lock in economic liberalization, says US’, in: Financial Times, 21 September 2006, p.3.
[4] ‘Asia: Mr Hu finally goes to Washington; China and America’, in: The Economist, 15 April 2006, p.64.
[5] Doug Guthrie, China and Globalization. The Social, Economic, and Political Transformation of Chinese Society (New York and Oxon, 2006), p.322.
[6] ‘From T-shirts to T-bonds’, in: The Economist, 28 July 2005, p.66.
[7] Guthrie, China and Globalization, pp.321-322.
[8] Interview with Dr David Williams, Cardiff University, 30 November 2006.
[9] Sources: WTO; Thomson Datastream; Economist Intelligence Unit, in: ‘From T-shirts to T-bonds’, p.66.
[10] Guthrie, China and Globalization, p.7.
[11] ‘From T-shirts to T-bonds’, p.66.
[12] Ronald C. Keith, ‘China as a Rising World Power and its Response to “Globalization”’, in: Ronald C. Keith (ed.), China as a Rising World Power and its Response to ‘Globalization’ (New York and Oxon 2005), pp.2-4.
[13] www.democrats.org [30 November].
[14] Caroline Daniel, Richard McGregor and Guy Dinmore, ‘Few Gains for Bush in China’, in: Financial Times, 20 November 2005.
[15] Guthrie, China and Globalization, p.311.
[16] Rosemary Foot, Practice of Power: US relations with China since 1949 (1997), electronic book on: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com [19 October 2006], p.262.
[17] ‘Asia: Out of their silos; China and America’, in: The Economist, 10 June 2006, p.64.
[18] Guthrie, China and Globalization, pp.309-310.
[19] ‘Meeting the superpower; China and the West’, in: The Economist, 19 November 2005, p.12; ‘Aphorisms and suspicions – China’s world order’, in: The Economist, 19 November 2005, p.24.

Should democracy dominate the world?

With a widely criticized prime minister and a poor 61 per cent turnout in the 2005 elections, the British political system seems to be no longer convincing. Still, Harold Gafo believes: “Every country in the world should adopt multiparty, parliamentary democracy as its political system as a matter of urgency.” It appears that Mr Gafo is suffering from some outdated Eurocentrism.
For western Europeans the benefits of our system are obvious. A democracy, any democracy, comprises more than just the right to vote in elections. The power is balanced by the many freedoms its inhabitants enjoy, most importantly freedom of speech and information. These freedoms effectively reflect public opinion and put pressure on politicians.
An additional benefit of the multiparty parliamentary system is that power is shared on all levels: between the functions of president or monarch and prime minister; institutionally between senates and parliaments; and ideologically between parties within the parliament and, in case of a coalition, the government.
A multiparty system is an effective way to represent the whole electorate. More people have a chance to participate actively in politics and there are more possibilities to vote for a party close to your own beliefs. After all, it is not the voter’s job to compromise. Furthermore, the presence of a parliament ensures that the parties in opposition have power according to their size. Even small parties can represent their voters, especially in a proportional election system, and, however small their influence is, this reflects the true meaning of the word democracy.
The downside of a multiparty parliament is the risk of endless discussion and compromises without strong decision-making. It may not even go as far as compromises and just lead to competition. This disadvantage became visible in recent European elections. After the votes were counted in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, it proved difficult to form a majority coalition of parties that are willing to cooperate. This could lead to disillusion and disinterest among the voters, a mood that was already present in the 2005 British elections.
However, despite of the apparent weakness in many current European governments and elections, the problems lie with individual politicians rather than within the system. A democratic, but unattractive alternative is a system as we see in the United States. Here the highest power lies with one leader and one party has the chance of dominating the whole political spectrum, while a big minority remains unrepresented.
Thus far, Mr Gafo has a point. Between all democracies, the multiparty parliamentary system does the best job in representing all people and balancing the power. The here disputed part of Mr Gafo’s statement concerns not the system, but the point that all countries in the world should adopt it as a matter of urgency. This idea, that what is good for Europe should be good for the rest of the world, is as old as European civilisation, yet highly questionable.
Democracy stems from a western body of thought and needs a certain foundation. Democracies and parliaments in western countries did not arise within one day; they developed over centuries. Like here, other countries will need a stable basis, a certain level of economy, mature parties and the right motives before any kind of democratic system can work.
The time has come for western powers to drop their view that a multiparty democracy is the only valid system of government. Especially economically weak and highly divided countries might be better of with a strong central leadership. India is a striking example of a multiparty democratic country where ideological plurality has led to competition rather than effective decisions. In the People’s Republic of China, on the other hand, a central one party system has brought an explosive economic development. China’s political system has been to the expense of democratic freedoms the people in India do enjoy, but most people consider prosperity and stability to be more urgent needs. Indeed, learning from China’s steady political reforms, we can conclude that democratic freedoms are following economic growth, and this is likely to happen in other developing countries too.

Our job is to support this economic development, instead of slowing it down by putting too much pressure on political reform. You cannot have it all in once.

Note: this article is written in New Statesman leader style and is meant to present the New Stateman's view, not my personal opinions.

For publication's sake

As my readers must have noticed, this is my blog. And I know that it is just a blog, which is meant for blogging, but it is also mine. And after reading the woodenspoon, I realised this gives me some opportunities. For example, I can use it to publish my articles. I know this is just a blog, and mine, and its readership is limited, but the fact that is is possible to publish my own articles is enough. Also, I like seeing what other people made of the same assignment. So I encourage all my classmates to follow the woodenspoon, like me. It would be such a waste of opportunity not to post your article online. Come on, MAIJ'ers, just do it! If not for me, for publication's sake.

For the love of plants

Me and plants never got along. It is not that I was never interested; on the contrary. I spent many happy hours assisting my mum gardening and walking through the forests. But as soon as I tried to raise my own green friend I miserably failed. I gave up after I became notoriously known as the girl who managed to kill a cactus.

I analysed my failures over and over again, but could not discover what went wrong. I tried everything: just a bit of water every week, lots of water daily, in front of the window, next to my bed… nothing could give my several plants the life spirit I hoped for. The only conclusion I could come up with was that plants really do need love.

I forgot about my period as a plant killer until this week, years after the death of my last cactus, something happened that confirmed this conclusion.

Not long after I started cooking as a student in Rotterdam, I discovered a magic ingredient. It is something that tastes good with almost everything, and whenever I add it to a dish I impress everyone. The flavour, the smell, the magic of it makes me look like a good cook.

Basil.

Still, it took me 4 years of university before I decided me and basil were ready for the next step. I mean, even when you have such a good relationship as me and basil it is quite a long-term commitment. But I decided to stop thinking about it and just jump into it. I bought myself a basil plant.

For some reason, I did not realise immediately that this basil plant was in fact a plant. Until today. I sat in the kitchen and all of a sudden it was there: beautiful, smelling great, green, and… alive. For a while I was amazed, but than I got it: I love basil.

It got me thinking though. Is this it? Would I still not love plants enough not to kill them, or is the survival of my basil an indication that I might be ready for more? A Christmas tree, maybe? Or maybe this is not about love at all. Maybe I just grew up.